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This article can be read as a trenchant discussion of current migrant-hostile politics in the 
Netherlands.  Analogous to the notion of low intensity conflict it introduces the term ‘low 
intensity ethnic cleansing’ and explores whether it can be applied to improve our analysis of 
Dutch migration and integration politics. Taking into account both Dutch migrant-hostile 
policies and voices of the most outspoken politicians, as well as the broader European context, 
this text shows an increasing and mainstreamed call for ethno-territorial homogeneity of the 
European and national space. While comparisons of European migration and integration 
regimes and signs of cleansing largely fall on deaf ears, the inconvenient truth is no longer 
avoided in this text.   
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On July 11, 1995, the Bosnian town of Srebreniça fell to the advancing Serbian army 
commanded by Ratko Mladić. Unlike the British, who sent their UN troops to defend another 
Bosnian enclave (Goražde) properly armed and equipped, the Dutch had sent in their UN 
troops without the means to defend themselves or the population. As bystanders they watched 
as Mladić and his troops went along to massacre 7,400 Bosnian Muslims.  
 At first glance, the connection to The Netherlands seems limited to the fact that the 
UN soldiers were Dutch. It seems totally out of order to suggest that there is more, such as a 
connection between Srebreniça and current Dutch migration and integration policies. Even 
more, any intent to connect such debates and policies to abhorring events like the Balkan 
massacres or those of the Holocaust, is considered inappropriate in the Netherlands. The 
dominant Dutch discourse rules out any association. 
However, at closer look we can no longer avoid the uneasy question whether there is 
in fact a conceptual connection between the blue helmets in Srebreniça and current Dutch 
policies and debates on migrants. The Srebreniça massacre is generally understood as a case 
of ethnic cleansing, i.e. a deliberate effort to ‘clean’ a certain territory from populations that 
are defined in ethnic terms (Cordell and Wolff 2011). To be sure, Dutch policies on migrants 
have not taken any lives so far, it seems (1), and belligerent migrant-hostile voices like Geert 
Wilders’ are not directly responsible for physical violence, it seems (2). Be that as it may, the 
Dutch government wants to make social rights dependent on ethnicity, enforces assimilation 
programmes upon migrants, violates human rights on a large scale and applauds detention 
camps, the ‘warehousing’ of refugees in border zones of war, and quota policing of illegal 
foreigners, as we will discuss in more detail below. Do these policies not amount to efforts to 
‘clean’ a certain territory from populations that are defined in ethnic terms? Have we reached 
a stage in The Netherlands where the concept of ethnic cleansing has become applicable? 
In this paper we introduce the notion of ‘low intensity ethnic cleansing’ (LIEC) by 
discussing several methods to achieve ethno-territorial homogeneity in the Netherlands and 
Europe at large. We argue that ethnic cleansing must be understood in its various (degrees of) 
manifestations. Rather than treating it as a monolithic phenomenon, it is more apt to place it 
on a sliding scale ranging from low intensity to high intensity ethnic cleansing, without 
assuming a fixed route from the former to the latter. Low intensity forms of ethnic cleansing 
must be studied in their own context without losing sight of that common denominator, i.e. 
ethnic cleansing. Understanding how certain manifestations of ethnic cleansing turn relatively 
undisputed over time is a crucial assignment for scholars. What appears to be a potentiality at 
one day may become reality at another. With Bauman (1989) we think that ethnic cleansing 
comes about in an incremental fashion and needs to be monitored closely at all times. 
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 LIEC is made possible, we posit, by the grounds of exclusion and the extent to which 
these are presented as acceptable or even legitimate. With racism being ever more (politically) 
discredited in post-war continental Europe (cf. Stolcke 1995), culture-based exclusion has 
gained popularity. We argue in part four of this text that culturism is professed to be 
reconcilable with a liberal democratic framework of merit and equality and that this explains 
the success of polemics against ‘other cultures’. We concentrate on the theoretical 
constructions of Stolcke (‘cultural fundamentalism’), Grillo (‘cultural anxiety’ and ‘cultural 
essentialism’), Schinkel (‘culturalism’ and ‘culturism’) and Vertovec (the ‘commonsensical 
structural-functionalism’ in contemporary culture-based exclusion). 
 In the subsequent part we come to the Dutch case. We discuss transformations as well 
as continuations of migration and integration politics in The Netherlands. Our focus is 
different from other studies as it includes both the migrant-hostile voices of the most 
outspoken politicians and their translations into policies under the aegis of mainstream 
governments. This combination in a single study is rare in the Dutch context. We shed light 
on the ascending culturism in Dutch migrant-hostile politics and examine if this can be 
studied as a legitimation of LIEC.   
 
Low intensity ethnic cleansing 
 
Ethnic cleansing refers to the expulsion of an ‘undesirable’ population from a given 
territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological 
considerations, or a combination of these (Bell-Fialkoff 1993: 110). On the most basic 
level, it is the deliberate policy of homogenizing the ethnic make-up of a territory. As 
this definition suggests, ethnic cleansing comprises not only ethnic expulsions and 
extermination during war, but also policies of ethnic homogenization undertaken 
during times of relative peace. […] In sum, ethnic cleansing consists of policies of 
ethnic expulsion and resettlement, which may be implemented either violently or non-
violently. These policies are undertaken with the purpose of achieving ethno-territorial 
homogenization (Jenne 2011: 112). 
 
The term ethnic cleansing usually draws our attention to the horrors of the Holocaust, 
Rwanda, Palestine, former Yugoslavia and the like. A simple search on a combination of the 
words ‘ethnic’ and ‘cleansing’ in scientific search engines keeps us far removed from 
contemporary immigration and integration policies in, let’s say, Western Europe. Only a few 
scholars do make the connection (Ahmed 1995 or Fekete 2005). However, as the academic 
discussion of the concept (Cordell and Wolff 2011) shows, it is not only a matter of kind but 
of degree as well. It is not only represented by its most virulent manifestations, like genocide 
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and mass murder, but also covers less violent forms that nonetheless aim at transforming a 
given territory into an ethnically homogeneous entity by non-violent means. Apparently, 
ethnic cleansing entails a sliding scale from less-violent and perhaps more subtle forms to 
outright violent manifestations, all having in common the aim of ethno-territorial 
homogenization.  
In discussing this sliding scale, we need to steer a middle course in that we neither 
stretch the concept so far that it becomes insulting to its worst case victims, nor keep it too 
narrow so that we underestimate the wretched situations of those who are subject to what 
Walters (2002) calls an ‘international policing of aliens’. In any case, we should forget at no 
time that  
 
while the concentration camp was the specific outcome of the Nazi’s genocidal dream 
of racial purity, its horrors [can] not obscure the fact that camps of one kind or another 
became the routine solution for the domicile of the “displaced persons” by the time of 
World War II (Arendt 1964: 279) in a large number of European countries’ (Walters 
2002: 284-285).  
 
Whilst wholesale comparisons of different camps in different times and places for sure 
point to macro hierarchies of human suffering, their micro instantiations may just as well 
disclose a number of similarities. It cannot be ruled out that the death of a Somali woman, 
mother of three accompanied children, who died pregnant due to medical neglect on the floor 
of the detention centre’s hallway in the Dutch town of Leersum, fits into a framework of 
deliberate efforts to create ethnic or national homogeneity in The Netherlands 
(www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl). 
But how are we to coin these policies and aims to (re)construct ethno-territorial 
homogeneity with a relatively low level of violence? We propose the term low intensity 
ethnic cleansing. It draws on the concept of low intensity warfare or conflict (LIC) that 
became operational under the Reagan administration in the 1980s with its clearest expression 
in the support this government mobilized for the so-called Contras in their fight against the 
Sandinista government in Nicaragua. It is warfare, but LIC abstains from massive bloodshed. 
It shares several features with LIEC (3).   
First, in both cases there is homogenization under the hegemony of a political power. 
LIC aims at political homogeneity under imperial reign, in the Nicaraguan case of the United 
States over Central America, whereas LIEC aims for ethnic homogeneity under the reign of 
e.g. the nation state or the EU. Second, LIC involves a variety of means (political, economic, 
informational, military etc.) to achieve this homogenization. Similarly, in the case of LIEC, a 
variety of means and policies are deployed; not just blunt deployment of force. Third, 
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compared to outright war, LIC makes relatively few casualties. Although in the Nicaraguan 
case the Contras did kill thousands of farmers, these numbers cannot be compared to the 
numbers of casualties in the bombing of Vietnamese cities. LIEC does involve the massive 
deportation of people who are considered to disrupt the ideal of a homogeneous territory, but 
this does not compare to mass murder. Fourth, due to its aggressive (and covered, see next 
paragraph) nature – it is war after all – it easily crosses the limits of legality. The Contras war 
was financed illegally as its funds were generated by Oliver North serving the Reagan 
administration by illegally selling arms to the Islamic Republic of Iran. As we will see below, 
current migration and integration policies show a similar tendency to derail into illegality. 
Fifth, LIC is preferably to be used in cases when there is a serious legitimacy problem. Its 
protagonists have a problem to justify it and need to go the extra mile to convince the public 
that actions are justified. This was true in the case of the US low intensity warfare against the 
Sandinista government that had come to power in a massive uprising against a dictator and 
was confirmed in democratic elections in 1984. In a similar vein, images of ‘well integrated 
asylum seekers’ being deported to places where they might not have been born, or footage of 
asylum seekers’ children who are put into custody, need an extra effort to convince the public 
that these policies are justified. This is self-defense. In short, both LIC and LIEC need 
ideological and propaganda efforts to be stepped up and in the case of the war against the 
Sandinistas cover up operations were initiated by letting mercenaries, the Contras, do the 
dirty work.  
 
Approach 
Do these five criteria of LIEC, developed analogous to the concept of LIC, make sense 
regarding current migrant-hostile policies and voices? In order to answer this question we 
conducted a two-layered study, focusing on both the European scene and the Dutch case. It 
must be pointed that – to keep this article at reasonable length – we limited our European 
study to a literature review. By including the work of scholars form the fields of international 
relations, legal studies, anthropology, sociology, and political science, we have attempted to 
deal with our main question on the basis of cross-disciplinarity.  
 Our analysis of Dutch migrant-hostile politics is more extensive in that it incorporates 
(1) both government policies and leading political voices; and (2) a diverse set of materials, 
including newspaper articles, governmental acts, political statements, policy papers, NGO 
reports, notes of parliamentary debates, (semi-)academic literature, films (e.g. Fitna and 
Submission), documentaries and television interviews, migration statistics, public speeches, 
integration/assimilation programmes, and website materials. We selected and screened these 
materials on the basis of the concepts in which both migrants and Dutch society are framed 





Low intensity ethnic cleansing in Europe? 
Migration has become one of the priorities on the political agenda, both of the EU and its 
Member States. In 2010, 32.5 million foreigners (6.5%) resided in the EU-27 of which the 
majority (20.2 million) was a citizen of a non-EU country (Eurostat 2011a). The EU and 
member states distinguish economic migrants from asylum seekers, but strive in both cases to 
be as restrictive as possible in granting access. In recent years, the number of asylum 
applications in the EU has dropped from 670,000 applications in 1992 (EU-15), 424,200 in 
2001 (EU-27), to 258,950 applications in 2010 (EU-27) (Eurostat 2011b). In 2010, only 
21.5% of the final asylum decisions resulted in positive outcomes with the grants of a refugee 
status, subsidiary protection status or authorization to stay for humanitarian reasons (Eurostat 
2011b).  
If we look at the technologies of immigration and integration law enforcement that are 
deployed to maintain the ‘territorial ideal’ (Cornelisse 2010), it is in particular the use of 
encampment and deportation that catches the eye. For a long time they have been considered 
secondary techniques for immigration control (Gibney 2008), but their use as governmental 
techniques to discipline immigrant populations is now ubiquitous in liberal democratic 
countries like the United States, The Netherlands, Germany, France, the UK, Canada and 
Australia (Anderson et al. 2011; Gibney 2008), something which brought Gibney to speak of 
a ‘deportation turn’. Detention camps – where undocumented or unauthorized migrants are 
interned and await admission or deportation – have sprouted throughout Europe and can now 
be found at several hundred locations (Wicker 2010). Facilitated by this ‘wide incarceral 
archipelago of detention centres’ (Walters 2002), each year around 100,000 immigrants are 
detained in Europe (de Giorgi 2010). Together with the images of desperately overcrowded 
boats trying to cross the Mediterranean, these camps depict the central tenet of government 
policies, i.e. to exclude as many undesirable migrants from European territory as possible. 
 These camps fit into an array of policies that try to (re)create the nostalgic idea of 
homogeneous national or European societies. These policies also include various pre-
departure integration strategies, now adopted by several EU Member States. The Netherlands, 
Germany and France introduced clauses in their integration acts that oblige migrants to 
partake in integration courses (France) and tests (The Netherlands and Germany) in their own 
country, but made exemptions for EU and EEA States, as well as Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and the US (Groenendijk 2011). 
 These pre-departure integration strategies are one facet of what is called the 
‘externalization of border control’ and testify to the decreasing willingness of EU Member 
States to deal with unwanted ‘ethnic others’ on their own soil. As preventive strategies, they 
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are highly effective contributions to the ‘territorial ideal’ and foreclose the need for deploying 
force to deport migrants. In the imitation of their Dutch predecessor (which pioneered in its 
kind), more and more EU Member States now start to introduce integration programmes at 
their embassies.  
 Other strategies for the externalization of EU frontiers (Andrijasevic 2010; Fekete 
2005; Karakayali and Rigo 2010) are classified by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in three 
groups. First, asylum seekers are readmitted to an alleged safe third country-nation (TCN) that 
was part of their migration trajectory. A number of EU Member States have adopted this safe-
TCN concept and concluded bilateral and multilateral readmission agreements (HRW 2006) 
(4). Second, development aid budgets are increasingly used to ‘warehouse’ asylum seekers in 
regions of origin (see also Fekete 2005). Whilst such ‘capacity building’ policies may have 
positive connotations (they might decrease the use of dangerous smuggling routes), most EU 
financial assistance for capacity-building has been spent on the enforcement of border 
controls (HRW 2006). Third, proposals are made to outsource asylum procedures to countries 
outside the EU, so that migrants who apply in Member States can be sent to transit processing 
centers outside the EU (HRW 2006; Karakayali and Rico 2010). In 2003, the UK proposed 
the construction of such transit centers for an extraterritorial processing of migrants’ claims, 
and these proposals were applauded by both The Netherlands and Denmark (HRW 2006). 
 The incarceration of those who are politically framed as non-citizens in detention 
camps does not only physically but also symbolically exclude them from mainstream society 
by marking them as a threat, as dangerous elements that need to be kept away from law 
abiding citizens (Anderson et al. 2011). There is an increased tendency to believe in the 
symbiosis of illegality and criminality (Bosworth 2008; De Giorgi 2010). In some European 
countries (e.g. Germany), illegal residence is already a criminal offence (cf. Broeders 2010); 
in others (e.g. The Netherlands) political pressure is mounting to use criminal law to deal with 
illegal residents (Regeerakkoord 2010) (5). Such a criminalization of illegal migrants is highly 
consequential, because the status of ‘illegality’ is everything but stable. Some (e.g. Engbersen 
and van der Leun 2001) talk about the construction of illegality. For instance, something 
perfectly legal as losing one’s job may turn a person illegal (De Giorgi 2010). In the most 
recent Dutch coalition agreement it is proposed that when a legal foreigner does not meet the 
required income demands, his or her residence permit will be withdrawn (Regeerakkoord 
2010). This means that there is ‘the constant threat of drifting into illegality’ (De Giorgi 2010: 
159) and an ongoing emphasis on ‘deportability’ (De Genova 2010: 34-36).  
This precarization is, as De Giorgi correctly observes, a powerful reminder of 
migrants’ subordinate position. Peutz and De Genova (2010: 18) write about a logic of 
deportation undergirded by ethno-national biopolitics through which the state’s deportation 
regime fashions its citizenry only by sorting and ranking the greater or lesser ‘foreignness’ of 
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various migrant others. ‘Cleansing our [societies] of those with undesirable qualities’ 
(Kanstroom 2000: 1892) goes together with the liberalization of cross-border business 
movement, something which led Sparke (2006) to introduce the notion of ‘business class 
citizenship’. In the words of De Giorgi’s (2010: 151):  
 
Although virtually no longer in existence for financial capitals and for a restricted 
global élite of cosmopolitan ‘tourists’ (Bauman 1998: 77), borders have thus resumed 
all their symbolic and material violence against specific categories of people 
(underprivileged, non-western, ‘Third-World’ migrants) who, as a consequence of the 
marginal position they occupy in the transnational circuits of production, are locked in 
the lowest regions of what Zygmunt Bauman (1998: 69-76) has called ‘the global 
hierarchy of mobility’. The unauthorized mobility of this ever more globalized 
proletariat, its actual or potential trespassing of the many ‘walls around the West’ 
(Andreas and Snyder 2000), are once again the target of punitive strategies of 
criminalization and illegalization. 
 
The point here is that the criminalization of migrants on European territory, the 
hierarchization of ‘foreignness’ and thus the right to belong to the national or European 
community, and the steeping up of extra demands put onto those migrants who do have a 
legal status, are all instances that point to the creation of a de facto hierarchy of citizenship 
with migrants relegated to a subordinated and precarious position. Increasingly, rights that 
non-migrants can count on are becoming curbed or conditional for migrants. Thus the basic 
principle of the rule of law in a liberal democracy, i.e. equality before the law, is de facto 
violated. By criminalizing migrants and subduing them into a subordinated position vis-à-vis 
the state, these policies themselves become illegal. 
Evidently, justification and legitimization work is required. The legitimacy of the 
measures that are increasingly taken by the EU and its Member States against unwanted 
migrants is sought to be restored by an imagination of the ‘cultural other’ who is said to hold 
on to cultural values and practices that are incompatible with those of ‘the West’. The severity 
of the ‘deportation regime’ (Fekete 2005; De Genova and Peutz 2010) and the consequent 
hardship that migrants face, could not be accounted for by migrant-hostile politicians if it 
would rest on racism. With racism being (politically) discredited in post-war continental 
Europe and obviously being in blunt opposition to the principles of a liberal democracy 
(Stolcke 1995), culture has gained in strength as an exclusionary power. 
 The construction of cultural difference between migrants and non-migrants to justify 
exclusionary policies towards migrants – Schinkel (2007) writes about ‘culturism’ here – 
tends to frame cultures as equal but incommensurable or incompatible. It is based on what 
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Grillo (2003: 158, italics and emphases original) calls cultural essentialism, ‘a system of 
belief grounded in a conception of human beings as “cultural” […] subjects, i.e. bearers of a 
culture, located within a boundaried world, which defines them and differentiates them from 
others’. Cultural essentialism presents cultures as bounded,  historic, and authentic entities. 
Culturism (Schinkel 2007) and cultural fundamentalism (Stolcke 1995) go one step further 
and add the notion cultural incommensurability in a single space. 
Rather than ordering them hierarchically, culturism ‘segregates them spatially, each 
culture in its place’, kept apart for their own good and preservation (Stolcke 1995). So, to 
cover up de facto hierarchization of access to citizenship, de forma cultural differences are 
basically framed on a horizontal basis that seemingly fits very well into a liberal democratic 
framework of equality before the law. After adding that those cultural differences are 
incompatible on European territory, an argument is provided for keeping out culturally other 
migrants. Moreover, de forma cultural boundaries are kept open for those migrants who 
cannot be expelled as, in theory, cultural boundary crossing is facilitated by offering an array 
of civic integration programmes to those migrants. If migrants wish to live in ‘our midst’, they 
can assimilate culturally (Stolcke 1995: 8). Culturism is presented to be compatible with a 
liberal democratic framework of equality and merit, in the sense that Western societies claim 
to be receptive if the individual bearer of a migrant culture takes responsibility to assimilate.  
De facto, however, such boundary crossing is immensely difficult if policies continue 
to construct classifications of ‘migrant others’ in terms of cultural distance. Such groupist 
thinking (Brubaker 2002), in which culture is seen as a designator of (ethnic) group 
affiliation, makes it very difficult for individuals to cross. The invitation to cross cultural 
boundaries may not be very convincing to migrants if they have been constructed as the 
cultural other by the very same policies in the first place. This may be particularly so when 
migrants’ cultural make-up is conceived of as an integrated whole of values, practices and 
social institutions that together are alleged to determine the whole of an individual’s being.  
What Vertovec (2011: 245) calls a ‘commonsense structural-functionalism’ is of 
special importance here. It causes people to see ‘all values, cultural practices, and social 
institutions as part of an integrated whole, a cohesive system based on the necessary 
interdependence and equilibrium of its parts. If one part is perceived to be vulnerable or 
expunged, the integrity of the entire system is considered to be in danger’.  Such structural-
functionalism not only explains why people may fear a loss of culture (Grillo’s ‘cultural 
anxiety’ is applicable here) when any cultural element seems to get lost – since that element is 
understood as constituting a necessary part of cultural integrity; it also helps to explain the 
persistent tendency to account of any lack of migrants’ (socio-economic) institutional 
participation by pointing to their cultural systems. The slightest sign of a ‘foreign accent’ in 
the host language may incite employers to turn down promotion applications of refugee 
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women in The Netherlands (Ghorashi and Van Tilburg 2006). An integrationist perspective 
fuels the inclination to blame socio-economic deprivations like unemployment, delinquency, 
and social service dependency on immigrants’ lack of ‘our’ culture (cf. Stolcke 1995). 
 In short, this brief overview suggests that the concept of LIEC makes sense in a 
European context. First, the objective is to (re)construct an ethnically homogeneous national 
or European space. Second, a variety of instruments is deployed, including deportation camps, 
strict assessment procedures as well as tactics to make citizenship conditional. Third, we have 
not found reliable figures on numbers of actual casualties, but they certainly do not amount to 
the numbers one would associate with genocide. Fourth, these policies operate on the verge of 
legality, in some respects even violating basic principles of a liberal democracy, like equality 
before the law and undivided and unconditional citizenship (and this is by no means limited to 
the European context; look for an Australian analogy into Every and Augoustinos 2008). 
Finally, massive propaganda is launched to construct legitimacy for these policies based on 
notions of cultural essentialism and fundamentalism. Belligerent voices like those of Geert 
Wilders or Thilo Sarrazin immediately catch the attention, but the basic premises of cultural 
fundamentalism have already been installed as the ideological foundation for the legitimation 
of LIEC.  
 
Low intensity ethnic cleansing in The Netherlands?  
1980s and 1990s  
Due to an economic recession and de-industrialization causing mounting employment rates 
among migrants in the 1980s, migration became an issue in Dutch politics. Initially, the Dutch 
government maintained a friendly position towards new immigration, opening doors for 
family reunification, naturalization, and refugees (Geuijen 2004). In the early 1990s, up to 
55,000 asylum seekers a year entered the country (www.cbs.nl).  
The government responded to admitted migrants (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 
1983) by pursuing equal treatment, proportional representation in (civil) society, and 
maintenance of migrants’ ‘ethnic-cultural identities’ (Entzinger 2003). Only those who lagged 
behind in institutional participation were targeted as objects of policy and public attention 
(Rath 1991) and government policies in the 1990s were intended to improve their 
participation (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1994). Legal obstacles to participation were 
removed, soft affirmative action legislation was launched, and the government concluded 
contracts in which more than 110 large firms and the SME branch organization pledged to 
take measures to increase the numbers of ethnic minorities in their labour force. These 
measures were inspired upon an advancing Dutch welfare state.  
 Apart from being categorized in terms of (deficient) institutional participation, non-
Western migrants were defined as cultural communities. This definition was predicated upon 
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a pillarized society (verzuiling), which had structured Dutch society until the 1960s/1970s in a 
relatively successful way. Each of the four pillars (Protestant, Catholic, Socialist, and – 
somewhat less salient – Liberal) had its own political party and/or church, trade unions, 
employer associations, media coverage etc. Ethnic minorities were understood as new 
varieties of such pillars, defined by their own norms, traditions, religion and language. The 
government financed special education in their own language and culture to support their 
cultural life (Entzinger 2003). Within this multicultural framework, individual migrants were 
framed as members of reified cultural communities, a membership that defined the essence of 
their being. Cultural relativism ruled relations between these communities and cross-
communitarian communication – let alone criticism – was basically ruled out (see Prins 1997 
for The Netherlands and Wikan 2002 for similar notions in Norway), except for folkloristic 
admiration of each other’s habits. 
We can invoke the notions of cultural essentialism and culturalism to characterize 
Dutch multiculturalism of the 1980s/1990s. Ethnic minorities were largely understood as 
reified, static and bounded cultural groups and such notions have contributed to the ‘othering’ 
of migrants (Ghorashi 2010). However, Vertovec’s structural-functionalism cannot be 
discerned from texts and debates of that period. Socio-economic institutional life was sharply 
distinguished from migrants’ cultural life and, by-and-large, governmental intervention was 
meant to enhance both. Employing the term culturism (or cultural fundamentalism) is even 
less obvious, as territorial closure and migrant-hostility had not yet appeared on the political 
scene. Anti-immigration propaganda by parties like the Nederlandse Volksunie, the 
Centrumpartij and Centrumdemocraten was effectively sidetracked from the public by 
mainstream politicians (van der Valk 2003) or outlawed by court decisions. These parties 
were in principal incapacitated on the basis of their racist ideas.  
 
Migrant-hostility on the rise 
It was a mainstream politician – Frits Bolkestein, leader of the right-wing liberals (VVD) – 
who first broke the silence between cultural communities, imposed by cultural relativism, and 
stated that minorities’ ‘integration’ was in a deplorable state (De Volkskrant, 12 September 
1991). Bolkestein and other spokespersons started to represent an emerging discontent in 
politics with migrants’ isolation (Rath 1991) and their ‘bastard spheres of integration’ like 
crime and welfare dependency (Engbersen and Gabriëls 1995). Bolkestein contended a debate 
was going on among ‘ordinary people’ who needed to be listened to (Prins 2002). Like Pim 
Fortuyn and Geert Wilders a few years later, he claimed to speak his mind about the ‘truth’ 
and the ‘facts’, and considered such truth-speak ‘typically Dutch’. Such essentialist claims as 
well as his concerns about an incompatibility of Dutch cultural traditions and those of non-
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Western migrants (Ghorashi 2010) reflected not only cultural essentialism but also cultural 
fundamentalism as he introduced the notion of cultural incompatibility.  
Such statements did not only express an ascending cultural anxiety – a fear of cultural 
loss. The call for a revival of ‘Dutch national awareness’ (initially coming from a social-
democrat, Paul Scheffer, see NRC Handelsblad 29 January 2000 and Vasta 2007) and the 
accompanying discourse of national heritage and canonization for a wider dissemination of 
national awareness, were also meant to reinforce the assumed Dutch culture and nationalism 
as a prerequisite for dealing successfully with migrants’ deficiency in institutional 
participation. Dutch migration and integration politics increasingly started to fall under the 
spell of a commonsense structural-functionalism, conflating cultural and (socio-economic) 
institutional life. In this vein, the 2003-2006 integration minister Rita Verdonk reiterately 
stated that migrants’ problems in the labour market correlated with their ‘deviating’ norms 
and values.  
The current government has fully appropriated this presumption. The social affairs 
minister Henk Kamp recently proposed to make citizens’ right on social security conditional 
upon Dutch language proficiency, with the explicit objective of reducing the number of ethnic 
minorities on benefit (NRC Handelsblad, 29 January 2012). Such a culturalization of social 
rights may deprive migrants completely of social security as cutbacks to zero benefits are 
proposed. In this line, the incumbent government also proposes to curtail social benefits when 
a job seeker’s behaviour or clothing decreases his or her employability (Regeerakkoord 2010). 
Whilst similar proposals by the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) a few years earlier (NRC 
Handelsblad, 3 April 2004) met considerable hesitation, a culture-based conditionality of 
social rights now seems to become commonplace. Fuelled by an integrationist perspective, 
language, norms, values, clothing and behaviour (i.e. culture) and institutional life are treated 
as an integrated whole.  
With Dutch culture set as the norm, governments have launched initiatives to reinforce 
this culture along nationalist lines, answering Scheffer’s call for national revival. These 
initiatives include the nationalist rewriting of official history textbooks and the official 
proclamation in Parliament of a canon of Dutch history. Advised by the communitarianist 
writer Amitai Etzioni (2001), christian-democrat Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende (2002- 
2010) made the revitalization of Dutch norms and values a key policy objective. Cultural fault 
lines are no longer accepted and migrants need to identify with what is typical to Dutch 
society, its rituals and key values (Ministerie van VROM 2007a: 14-17). The 2003-2006 
integration minister Rita Verdonk proposed in vain to express migrants’ degree of cultural 
assimilation in specific vignettes. She did succeed, however, in the introduction of a 




Earlier vain proposals by the LPF to ban double nationality – despite being a constant 
issue for politicians of questioning migrants’ loyalty to the Dutch state – are renewed by the 
coalition agreement, which promises the introduction of a law that prohibits double 
nationality. Similarly, earlier LPF ideas to oblige migrants to sign a contract symbolic for 
their loyalty to the Dutch state were dismissed (NRC Handelsblad, 3 April 2004). Now, 
however, the government intends to introduce an admission exam that tests whether family 
reunion migrants affiliate stronger with The Netherlands than with any other country 
(Regeerakkoord 2010).  
In terms of spatial control, cultural assimilation policies like Spreidingsbeleid are 
intended to disperse migrants to prevent or disrupt ‘ethnic community building’ (Gijsberts and 
Dagevos 2007). Local initiatives too have been developed to force migrants’ assimilation. 
Concluding the ‘Islam debates’, the local authorities in Rotterdam have launched the 
Rotterdam Code that obliges migrants to talk Dutch in public spaces and to raise their children 
in Dutch language and culture (NRC Handelsblad, 20 January 2006). Special officers are 
authorized to intrude in migrants’ private spheres to guard Dutch norms and values. War-like 
language is used, calling these officers ‘city commandos’. 
These various shifts from the margins to the centre of proposals of leading migrant-
hostile voices indicate that those voices and actual government policies have become very 
much intertwined. It is under the aegis of mainstream governments that migrant-hostility as 
expressed by spokespersons like Pim Fortuyn or Geert Wilders is being successfully 
translated into policies. For sure, extremist proclamations by Fortuyn (Islam as a ‘backward 
culture’, ‘the abolition of the constitutional article that bans discrimination’), Hirsi Ali (in the 
film Submission, making Islam responsible for massive violence against women), van Gogh 
(repeatedly calling Muslims ‘goat fuckers’), and Wilders (referring to Muslims as ‘Moroccan 
street scum’, calling for a taxation of ‘skull rags’, headscarves, and labeling the Koran a 
fascist book) have not been approved of by mainstream government officials. Nevertheless, 
these voices are in line with the basic tenets of government policies regarding migrants and 
migration that have emerged basically since the turn of the century. 
 
Policy development 
It was already in 1998 and 2000, when migrant-hostile politics as we know it now was still in 
statu nascendi, that respectively the Civic Integration Newcomers Act (Wet Inburgering 
Nieuwkomers, WIN) and the Aliens Act (Vreemdelingenwet) were issued. WIN reflected a 
shift from a by-and-large state-supported ethnic infrastructure (the fifth pillar) to an obligation 
for non-EU newcomers to take a 12-month integration course, i.e. 600 hours of Dutch 
language training, civic education and preparation for the Dutch labour market (Jopke 2007). 
Though this continued as a state-paid service, financial penalties followed non-compliance. In 
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the wake of the murder of Pim Fortuyn, integration policies became more coercive and shifted 
attention from civic to cultural integration, i.e. applicants were come to be assessed on their 
appropriation of Dutch norms and values (Jopke 2007; Ministerie van VROM 2007b). After a 
revision of the Act in 2006, migrants were also obliged to pay for the courses in full. Whilst 
the government did initially not succeed in extending the integration test to the 800.000 
admitted migrants, it did get away with making the acquirement of a permanent resident 
permit conditional upon the passing of integration tests. 
 This was a landmark step in the development of policies favouring territorial closure, 
making it possible for the first time to withhold permanent residence rights on cultural 
grounds. On 1 January 2007 the WIN was replaced under the aegis of the integration minister 
Rita Verdonk and justice minister Ernst Hirsch Ballin by the WI (Wet Inburgering; 
Integration Act), which compelled admitted migrants to take integration tests as well 
(Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 2011). The current government repeatedly proposes in its 
coalition agreement to revise or disregard European law to further stricter migration and 
integration legislation and to blur a distinction between the two to the point of dissolving the 
latter in the former. Previously, migration control and immigrant integration belonged to 
different policy domains, but ‘now the lack of integration is taken as grounds for the refusal of 
admission and residence’ (Jopke 2007: 8). 
 The negotiations for another revision of the WIB, necessary to legitimize the 
deployment of integration policy instruments to select and exclude migrants from admission, 
cumulated in the WIB (Wet Inburgering Buitenland; Integration Abroad Act) that was issued 
in March 2006 (Bonjour 2010; Groenendijk 2011). The WIB takes the fusion of migration and 
integration control to a whole new level (Bonjour 2010). In 2004 a bill was already presented 
that mandated pre-departure language tests for all migrants coming to The Netherlands. The 
bill was initially contested on grounds of validity of the language test (considered 
questionable) and the arrangement of facilities to learn Dutch in the countries of origin 
(considered insufficient) (Groenendijk 2011).  
Nonetheless, integration minister Rita Verdonk brushed aside all critique. All major 
parties, the Greens excluded, voted in favour of the act (Bonjour 2010; Groenendijk 2011). 
The bill was signed into law and from March 2006 onwards, specific groups of migrants need 
to take an admission test in their home country that assesses their knowledge of the Dutch 
language and customs, before applying for admission (cf. Suvarierol 2012). Political rhetoric 
has it that the test is meant to facilitate the integration of new migrants, but the WIB is highly 
selective since people from EU and EEA States, as well as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
Japan, South Korea and the United States are exempted (Groenendijk 2011). HRW (2008), in 
its report ‘The Netherlands: Discrimination in the Name of Integration’, has denounced the 
Dutch government for systematically violating human rights with the enactment of WIB. 
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Likewise, the European Court of Justice, citing the European Convention on Human Rights, 
reproved the new Dutch policies on immigration and integration (de Leeuw and van Wichelen 
2012). Ignoring such denouncements, the Dutch government has made the examination stiffer 
and now suggests modifying the EU Family Reunification Directive (2003/86) in order to 
come with stricter demands (in terms of age, income etc.). It is openly stated that the 
government will optimally use its juridical leeway to make family reunification policies as 
strict and selective as possible (Regeerakkoord 2010: 21). 
 In the wake of the Vreemdelingenwet of 2000, issued by the social-democrat state 
secretary Job Cohen, asylum seekers too are increasingly worse off in The Netherlands. The 
number of asylum applications has significantly dropped from 55.000 in 1994 to 9.700 in 
2007 (www.cbs.nl) and less than half of the applications are eventually granted after 
procedures of many years. Any drop in asylum applications is welcomed by the minister in 
charge. International institutions like HRW (Trouw 9 April 2003), The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (de Volkskrant 28 October 2006) and The European Court 
of Human Rights (de Volkskrant 12 January 2007) have recurrently denounced the Dutch 
government for systematically violating the human rights of asylum seekers.  
Recently, the ministers of Immigration, Integration and Asylum (Gerd Leers) and 
Security and Justice (Ivo Opstelten) have made legislative proposals for quota to expel illegal 
foreigners. If the bill passes, undocumented foreigners will be proactively tracked by the 
Alien Police and expelled, regardless of criminal offense. The police is instructed to use 
ethnic profiling, i.e. to focus their surveillance particularly on those who can be identified as 
foreigners. In this line, the current government intends to penalize illegal stay on Dutch 
territory (Regeerakkoord 2010). It also intends to give priority to the deportation of families 
with children, to rest the onus of proof even more with the applicant, and to deport those who 
are criminally prosecuted, whether they are illegal or not. In line with Europe’s 
externalization agenda, proposals are done to transfer parts of development aid budgets to 
develop warehousing facilities in conflict regions (Regeerakkoord 2010).   
All of these government plans motivate expulsion of the alien poor and reflect the 
ongoing shift of a human rights perspective to stressing the need to keep out ‘fortune hunters’ 
(Geuijen 2004). Target policies to reduce the number of asylum claims signify a bypass of the 
humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention (Fekete 2005). How, we are morally 
obliged to ask (as Fekete 2005: 65 does), can individual asylum claims be objectively 
assessed and refugees displaced by war effectively protected, if the asylum process is 
predetermined by quasi-quotas?  
Moreover, the main grounds on which asylum applications are assessed, the so-called 
Ambstberichten of the Dutch embassies, only provide information on an aggregated level, not 
on whether a particular asylum seeker’s life is in danger or not. This procedure tolerates 
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arbitrariness in decisions about asylum applications. Even more, those facing failed 
application can often not be ‘returned to sender’ (Broeders 2010) because that ‘sender’ often 
refuses re-entrance. As a result, people are pushed into illegality and if they subsequently are 
caught by the police, they run the risk of being detained in prisons where their health is 
protractedly undermined (Zembla 20 January 2012). 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
We argue that extremist migrant-hostile voices are in line with the basic objectives and 
premises of Dutch government policies since the turn of the century. For example, Geert 
Wilders’ calls for mass deportation of Muslims (www.pvv.nl) essentially corresponds to the 
official deportation regime. His calls for taxing ‘skull rags’ are in tune with official civic 
integration policies that force migrants to assimilate. Both these voices and official 
government policies since the turn of the century define migrants in cultural terms and 
prescribe their cultural assimilation as a condition for participating in Dutch society, even as a 
condition for being on Dutch territory. Thus their assumed ‘own cultures’ are defined as 
incompatible with assumed Dutch culture leaving them two options: assimilate or leave. In 
other words, both voices and policies aim at ethnic homogenization on Dutch territory. That 
holds true for efforts to keep as many migrants as possible from entering the country, to 
deport as many of them as possible and to force those who cannot be deported to assimilate 
into ‘Dutch culture’. This aligns with the first criterion of LIEC discussed above. 
 We can readily see that the second criterion, i.e. the deployment of a variety of 
policies and instruments, is met too. The actual use of force is only a minor component 
although it is on the rise, as the Dutch police is instructed to arrest a certain quota of ‘illegal 
aliens’ and to imprison them until their final expulsion. This can de facto mean life-long 
imprisonment (interrupted by short periods ‘on the streets’), since return is often impossible 
(e.g. De Genova and Peutz 2010).  
Nevertheless, genocidal proportions have clearly not been reached, so the third 
criterion of LIEC is also met. The same holds true for the fourth one: derailment into 
illegality. Both Dutch assimilation and immigration policies have been denounced for 
systematically violating human rights by almost all important international human rights 
agencies and courts. It has become standard procedure for the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service to simply ignore sentences by the Dutch judiciary. Moreover, the de facto creation of 
second class citizenship for migrants and the hierarchization of access to citizenship rights 
based on cultural arguments violate basic notions of undivided citizenship.  Consequently, 
there is a strong need for legitimation and justification work. In doing so, both extremist 
voices like Geert Wilders and official Dutch government policies deploy notions of cultural 
essentialism – framing migrants as bearers and representatives of a different culture – and of 
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cultural fundamentalism – the notion that cultures are incompatible and incommensurable and 
that representatives of different cultures cannot live together in one and the same space.  
We posit that present-day cultural fundamentalism builds upon the cultural 
essentialism in multiculturalism of the 1980s/1990s and that this carry-over is one of its key 
success factors. Another success factor – emphasized earlier – is cultural fundamentalism’s 
ostensible compatibility with a liberal democratic framework of equality and merit. We can 
now see that this entails two sides of the same (neo)liberal coin. On the one side, people like 
Pim Fortuyn, Geert Wilders and Theo van Gogh called Islam a ‘backward culture’ (stressing 
notions of hierarchy and superiority), but defended themselves by claiming the right to feel 
this way just like any other person has the right to a personal opinion in a democratic and 
egalitarian society, in an effort to reconcile their views with democratic equality before the 
law. On the other side we have the argument that cultural boundaries can in principal be 
crossed by individuals, if they ‘take their responsibility’. Nonetheless, this is merely a false 
pretence. As long as migrants are initially located outside of ‘Dutch community’ and the 
norms and values they should adopt remain to be casted as belonging to this community only, 
and as long as migrants’ cultures are proclaimed to be the essence of who they are, 
(acceptation of) crossovers become(s) de facto very unlikely. 
Culturism’s or cultural fundamentalism’s third success stems from its assistance by a 
commonsense structural-functionalism that accomplishes a fusion of cultural and economic 
arguments to exclude migrants. Instead of the ramshackle and multifaceted institutions, values 
and cultural practices in various domains of society that together make up the framework 
within which non-migrants and migrants work out their differences (cf. Freeman in Vertovec 
2010), a coherent whole is assumed in which institutional or economic and cultural life are 
bound to be interlinked. It is in this light that we must understand Wilders’ calculations of the 
‘costs of migration’. This economic rationale does not supplant but supplement a cultural 
rationale: on top of the alleged incompatibility of Dutch culture and (non-Western) migrant 
cultures, an institutional laziness is assumed to be inherent to the latter. The economic jargon 
(‘fortune hunters’, ‘asylum shopping’) depicts migrants as profiteers of the welfare state, 
which either results in a culturalization or even ethnicization of welfare for those who legally 
stay on Dutch territory, or contributes to a territorial lockout for those who planned or were 
forced to migrate to The Netherlands. 
In short, we argue that there are good reasons for introducing the term LIEC and apply 
it to current migration and assimilation policies and debates in The Netherlands as part of a 
more general pattern in Europe. The borrowing of the idea of ‘low intensity’ from the concept 
of low intensity conflict or low intensity warfare also makes sense to characterize a kind of 
ethnic cleansing that is relatively low-key in violence, with its ensuing tendencies to derail 
into illegality and violation of the rule of law and strong needs for justification and 
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legitimation work. A first exploration of the main differences between LIC and LIEC suggests 
a main divergence. LIC assumes a rather centralized command structure stemming from 
places like the oval office or the Pentagon, whereas LIEC does not necessarily entail a 
centralized orchestration. In the Dutch case there does not seem to be any coordinating 
mechanism involving both policy makers and extremist voices. Further research is imperative 






(1) We cannot be absolutely sure, though. In December 2005, news came out that the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) had made it a standard procedure to 
deliver information gathered during interrogations of asylum seekers from Congo to 
the Congolese authorities when these asylum seekers were sent back to Kinshasa. 
Something similar has taken place in the case of asylum seekers from Syria. Whether 
these people survived deportation  is unknown. 
(2) We cannot be absolutely sure about that either, as Anders Behring Breivik, who killed 
77 Norwegian citizens on July, 22, 2011, stated in his manifesto that he feels inspired 
by Geert Wilders. 
(3) United States Department of the Army (5 December 1990), Field Manual 100-20: 
Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-
20/10020ch1.htm#s_9  
(4) Denmark, Sweden, Norway, The Netherlands and the UK have for instance concluded 
such agreements with Iraq (cf. Fekete 2011). 
(5) De facto, criminal law is already applicable to illegal migrants in The Netherlands. 
When illegal migrants are apprehended several times, they can be declared 
‘undesirable aliens’, by the Dutch State. Continued residence of undesirable aliens is 
seen as a crime against the State and punishable with six months imprisonment 
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